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Are Home Prices the Next 
“Bubble”? 
1.I n t r o d u c t i o n
he rapid increase in home prices over the past several years 
has raised concerns about the existence of a speculative 
bubble in this asset market. A closely related concern—
irrespective of any existing bubble—is whether home prices are 
susceptible to a steep decline that could have a severe impact on 
the broader economy.
Indeed, home prices have been rising rapidly. Since 1995, 
real home prices have increased about 36 percent, roughly 
double the increase of previous home price booms in the late 
1970s and late 1980s (Chart 1).1 Moreover, home prices 
continued to rise strongly during the 2001 recession, the 
sluggish recovery through mid-2003, and the recent period of 
more rapid growth.
Many analysts argue that the recent growth in home prices 
is symptomatic of a housing bubble that will burst—just as the 
stock market bubble did—thus erasing a significant portion of 
household wealth.2 They add that such a decline in household 
wealth would have adverse macroeconomic effects, as already 
overextended consumers reduce spending to boost saving and 
improve their weakened financial condition.
In this article, we assess the evidence in support of a bubble 
in U.S. home prices and discuss whether a severe decline in 
these prices is likely. We also examine the effects of a steep drop 
in home prices on the broader national economy.
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• Home prices have been rising strongly since the 
mid-1990s, prompting concerns that a bubble 
exists in this asset class and that home prices 
are vulnerable to a collapse that could harm the 
U.S. economy.
• A close analysis of the U.S. housing market in 
recent years, however, finds little basis for such 
concerns. The marked upturn in home prices is 
largely attributable to strong market 
fundamentals: Home prices have essentially 
moved in line with increases in family income 
and declines in nominal mortgage interest rates.
• Moreover, weaker economic conditions are 
unlikely to trigger a severe drop in home 
prices. Historically, aggregate real home 
prices have fallen only moderately in periods 
of recession and high nominal interest rates.
• While such conditions could lead to lower home 
prices in states along the east and west 
coasts—areas where an inelastic supply of 
housing has made home prices particularly 
sensitive to changes in demand—regional price 
declines in the past have not had devastating 
effects on the broader economy.
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Chart 1
Home Price Appreciation as Measured 
by OFHEO Index
Source: Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight (OFHEO).
Notes: Bars indicate periods designated national recessions by the 
National Bureau of Economic Research. Shaded areas represent 

















Examining the possible effects of a severe decline in home 
prices is important because of the large role that real estate 
plays in aggregate household portfolios. According to the Flow 
of Funds Accounts compiled by the Board of Governors of the 
Federal Reserve System, households held about $14.6 trillion in 
real estate at the end of 2003:3. This figure accounts for about 
28 percent of households’ assets and is more than 130 percent 
of GDP. By comparison, households held about $12.8 trillion 
of corporate equities and mutual funds in 2000:1—the peak of 
the stock market. Furthermore, equity holdings are 
concentrated at the upper end of the wealth distribution, 
whereas housing is the major asset for most households.3
Economists have identified a number of ways in which 
fluctuations of home prices and home price bubbles could 
affect the aggregate economy. Higgins and Osler (1998) find 
evidence of regional home price bubbles around 1989 that had 
a negative effect on residential investment, and thus aggregate 
output, in those regions.4 Another potential effect of a severe 
home price decline could come from a consumption “wealth 
effect.” Although the magnitude of this effect remains 
controversial in some quarters, a number of studies—
including Case, Quigley, and Shiller (2001), Skinner (1996), 
and Case (1992)—find significant wealth effects from housing 
assets.5 If the magnitude of the wealth effect from housing is 
around 5 percent, which is a widely used estimate,6 then a 
severe decline in home prices could lead to reductions in 
consumption of around $150 billion, which is just slightly less 
than 2 percent of total personal consumption expenditures.
An additional concern is the effect of a severe drop in home 
prices on the mortgage market. A sharp fall in prices could lead 
to more foreclosures and unanticipated losses for lenders, 
straining the financial system (for example, see Case [2000]).7 
Furthermore, financial accelerator effects, whereby a negative 
economic shock is amplified by deteriorating credit market 
conditions, could exacerbate these developments and lead to a 
greater general economic decline.8 Given these possible macro-
economic effects, we believe it is important to evaluate the 
evidence suggesting a potential bubble or severe price decline. 
Our main conclusion is that the most widely cited evidence 
of a bubble is not persuasive because it fails to account for 
developments in the housing market over the past decade.9 
In particular, significant declines in nominal mortgage interest 
rates and demographic forces have supported housing 
demand, home construction, and home values during this 
period. Taking these factors into account, we argue that market 
fundamentals are sufficiently strong to explain the recent 
path of home prices and support our view that a bubble does 
not exist.
As for the likelihood of a severe drop in home prices, our 
examination of historical national home prices finds no basis 
for concern. Even during periods of recession and high 
nominal interest rates, aggregate real home prices declined only 
moderately. However, weakening fundamentals could have a 
larger impact on areas along the east and west coasts—where 
the supply of new housing is believed to be inelastic, home 
prices historically have been volatile, and home price 
appreciation has been strongest. In the event of such a 
weakening, home prices in these areas may fall, as they have in 
the past. Nevertheless, these past episodes of home price 
declines—although significant regionally—did not have 
devastating effects on the national economy.
2. Home Price Measures
Constructing an index of home prices across the nation or a 
region is a complex exercise because home sales do not occur in 
centralized markets, as do, for example, corporate equity 
transactions. Moreover, the price index used can have dramatic 
ramifications on the assessment of whether a home price 
bubble exists. Therefore, it is helpful to begin our analysis by 
discussing the properties of the four principal home price series 
used to measure national trends in home prices: the median 
price of existing homes sold, the median price of new homes sold, 
the repeat sales price index, and the constant-quality new home 
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The median price of existing homes sold is published 
monthly by the National Association of Realtors and the 
median price of new homes sold is published monthly by the 
Bureau of the Census of the U.S. Department of Commerce. 
Neither series is seasonally adjusted, despite apparent 
seasonality, particularly for existing home prices. In addition, 
both series are volatile in the short run, as the regional and 
product mix of sales varies from month to month. Further, 
because the underlying price data reflect only recent sales, the 
series may not accurately reflect housing stock values.10 Thus, 
neither index is ideal for determining the existence of a bubble. 
One method to remedy the effects of the mix of sales on 
home price measurement is a repeat sales index.11 The Office of 
Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight produces a version of 
such an index for the fifty states and Washington, D.C., by 
observing sales prices or appraised values of properties on 
which the mortgage loans have been purchased by Fannie Mae 
and Freddie Mac more than once, thus the term “repeat 
sales.”12 OFHEO creates a national index by computing a 
weighted average of the state indexes, with the weights based on 
the number of households in each state according to the 1990 
census. We refer to this national index as the OFHEO index. 
Because the index is based on loans purchased by Fannie Mae 
and Freddie Mac, it is limited to homes purchased (or loans 
refinanced) with conventional mortgage loans at or below the 
conforming loan limit.
The OFHEO index is sometimes referred to as a “constant-
quality” home price index because it is based on prices of the 
same properties at different points in time.13 However, the 
OFHEO index does not take into account changes in the 
physical characteristics of homes and so does not control for 
depreciation or additions and alterations between sale dates 
that could have changed the quality of the home.14 As we show, 
these factors influence the pattern of home price inflation 
measured using this index.
A home price index that explicitly attempts to take into 
account the physical and locational characteristics of homes 
sold is the constant-quality new home price index, published 
by the U.S. Bureau of the Census. Hedonic methods—using 
regressions of home prices on characteristics such as total 
square footage, number of bedrooms, number of bathrooms, 
and the presence of air conditioning and fireplaces—are 
applied to data on new home sales to construct a price index 
for a constant-quality home, including the value of the lot.15 
A national home price index is constructed as a weighted 
average of indexes for the four major census regions, with 
weights based on home sales activity in the base year.
The cumulative increase of all four home price indexes over 
the years for which there are data (1977:1 to 2003:3) is 
presented in the table along with the standard deviation of the 
quarterly growth rates of each series. The cumulative increase 
of the median prices of both new and existing homes is 
essentially the same as that of the OFHEO index, although the 
median measures are considerably more volatile. However, the 
constant-quality new home index has increased much less than 
the other three indexes.16
We know that the quality of new homes sold—measured by 
size and amenities—has increased over time.17 The fact that the 
OFHEO (repeat sales) index has increased by roughly as much 
as the median new home price suggests that the OFHEO index 
is not a constant-quality index. Furthermore, it appears that 
the OFHEO index rises relative to the constant-quality new 
home index during periods when additions and alterations to 
Home Price Appreciation as Measured

















  (percent) 337 311 321 199
Standard
  deviation of
  quarterly
  growth 9.7 11.0 3.9 7.2
Sources: National Association of Realtors; U.S. Department of Commerce, 
Bureau of the Census; Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight 
(OFHEO).
Notes: The median price of existing homes sold index is produced 
monthly by the National Association of Realtors and is not seasonally 
adjusted. The median price of new homes sold index is produced monthly 
by the U.S. Bureau of the Census and is not seasonally adjusted. The 
OFHEO (repeat sales) index is produced quarterly by the Office of Federal 
Housing Enterprise Oversight from data on mortgages purchased by 
Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae. The constant-quality new home price index 
is produced quarterly by the U.S. Bureau of the Census using the hedonic 
method on new home sales.
Any home price series used to assess the 
existence of a bubble should attempt to 
control for location and changes in quality. 4 Are Home Prices the Next “Bubble”?
Chart 2
Relationship between OFHEO Index 
and Home Improvement Spending
Sources: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census and 
Bureau of Economic Analysis; Office of Federal Housing Enterprise 
Oversight (OFHEO).
Note: Shaded areas indicate periods designated national recessions 
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Ratio of OFHEO Index to Constant-Quality 
New Home Index
Additions and Alterations per Unit
existing homes are particularly strong, such as in the late 1980s 
and late 1990s (Chart 2).18 Therefore, although the OFHEO 
index controls for changes in the geographic mix of units sold, 
it does not control for changes in the mix within states and for 
changes in quality that occur within units.19
These comparisons of the various home price series suggest 
that a significant portion of price increases in some series—
including the OFHEO index—can be attributed to increases in 
quality. As our analysis shows, the home price index used can 
have dramatic implications for one’s assessment of whether a 
home price bubble exists. Of the indexes available, we believe 
that the constant-quality new home price index is most 
appropriate for this assessment because it is the only one that 
explicitly controls for changes in quality over time. Any home 
price series used to assess the existence of a bubble should 
attempt to control for location and changes in quality. 
Otherwise, a perceived increase in home prices may reflect only 
the demand for more housing services that can be obtained 
through better quality homes with more amenities, even as 
the price of a standardized unit of housing services may stay 
the same.
Nonetheless, the hedonic method used in constructing the 
constant-quality new home price index has its own limitations 
and critics.20 Moreover, it can be argued that a new home price 
index, even one that accurately controls for quality, does not 
adequately capture changes in land values. 
In a theoretical growth model of a metropolitan area, new 
construction occurs only at the fringe, where the supply of land 
is assumed to be perfectly elastic. Since the supply of land closer 
to the central business district is by definition inelastic, such 
land prices will rise more rapidly than those on the fringe as the 
metropolitan area grows. In such a case, a price index that 
concentrates on new homes may underestimate overall home 
price inflation.
However, there are reasons to believe that this theoretical 
model may not present an accurate depiction of reality. First, 
all new housing construction does not occur on the fringe. In 
fact, so-called in-fill development has been a growing 
phenomenon over the past decade. Second, land prices 
probably are influenced by factors other than the distance to 
the central business district of a metropolitan area. Such factors 
would include crime, schools, and other neighborhood 
characteristics. These other factors imply that the land supply 
on the fringe is neither homogeneous nor elastic. Moreover, 
sellers of this land are likely to be keenly aware of its value for 
residential use. Finally, many state and local governments, as 
well as private organizations, have become bidders for 
undeveloped land in an effort to preserve open space. Thus, the 
price of land used in new housing construction may rise more 
rapidly than the price of previously developed land, implying 
that a new home price index does not necessarily under-
estimate home price inflation.
3. Evidence of a Bubble 
in U.S. Home Prices
Before discussing the existence of a bubble, we need to define 
the term. We subscribe to the definition from Stiglitz (1990):
If the reason the price is high today is only because 
investors believe that the selling price will be high 
tomorrow—when “fundamental” factors do not seem to 
justify such a price—then a bubble exists (p. 13).
Accordingly, the key features of a bubble are that the level of 
prices has been bid up beyond what is consistent with 
underlying fundamentals and that buyers of the asset do so 
with the expectation of future price increases.FRBNY Economic Policy Review / December 2004 5
Chart 3
Ratio of Median Price of Existing Homes Sold 
to Median Family Income
Sources: Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight; 
U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis; 
National Association of Realtors.
Notes: The ratio is calculated by dividing the median sales price of an 
existing home by median family income. Median family income for 


























Ratio of Owners’ Equivalent Rent to OFHEO Index 
Sources: Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight (OFHEO); 
U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics.
Note: Shaded areas indicate periods designated national recessions 




























Although some press accounts treat the rapid rate of 
increase in national home price series as prima facie evidence of 
a bubble, our definition dictates that such increases alone are 
necessary but not sufficient evidence. Additional evidence that 
relates current home prices to their fundamental determinants 
is required to solidify any claim of a bubble. Two such 
measures that have been widely used to support claims of a 
bubble are home prices relative to household income and 
home prices relative to rents.21
The ratio of the median home price to median household 
income is one frequently employed measure of home 
ownership affordability. If this ratio is relatively high, then 
households should find both down payments and monthly 
mortgage payments more difficult to meet, which should 
reduce demand and lead to downward pressure on home 
prices. In fact, the median home price, based on the OFHEO 
index, is now about three times median household income, 
surpassing the previous peak in the late 1970s and early 1980s, 
when there was arguably a bubble in the housing market 
(Chart 3). Moreover, and of relevance to our analysis, home 
prices experienced a sizable decline in real terms over the few 
years following that previous peak. 
Another common way to evaluate home price fundamentals 
is to compare them with the implicit rents that homeowners 
receive from owning their homes. Implicit rent, or owners’ 
equivalent rent, is defined as the rent a homeowner would 
have to pay to rent a housing unit similar to his home, or 
equivalently, the rent a homeowner could receive if she rented 
her home to a tenant. As such, implicit rent is a return to the 
homeowner from owning her home, much like a dividend is a 
return to the stockholder from owning stock in a company.
Therefore, the ratio of the owners’ equivalent rent index 
from the consumer price index (CPI) to the OFHEO home 
price index is often treated as the real estate equivalent of a 
dividend-to-price ratio for corporate equities. A low rent-to-
price ratio suggests that the return on the housing asset for 
homeowners is low relative to other assets that they could hold 
and thus is unlikely to persist. For the return to rise to a level 
comparable with returns on competing assets, home prices 
would have to fall.22 Recently, this homeowner’s dividend-to-
price ratio reached an historic low (Chart 4).23 The last time the 
ratio fell below its long-run average—the late 1980s—real 
home prices subsequently declined significantly.
4. Critique of the Bubble Evidence
The two measures of home price fundamentals presented 
above both support the notion of a home price bubble and 
suggest that home prices are likely to fall, at least in real terms, 
in the near future. However, these measures have flaws that call 
into question these conclusions.
First, neither measure takes interest rates into account. 
Clearly, interest rates should matter in assessing the existence 
of a bubble because they influence home ownership 
affordability and because they represent the yield on a 
competing asset in a household’s portfolio. The downward 6 Are Home Prices the Next “Bubble”?
Chart 5
Maximum Loan Amount with Median Family 
Income at Prevailing Mortgage Rates 
Thousands of dollars
Sources: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System; 
U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census; 
National Association of Realtors; authors’ calculations.
Note: Median family income for 2002 and 2003 is based on 
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Chart 6
Ratio of Principal and Interest Payments 
for Constant-Quality New Home to Median 
Family Income
Sources: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census; 
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System; National 
Association of Realtors; authors’ calculations. 
Notes: Median family income for 2002:1 to 2003:3 is based on 
estimates from the National Association of Realtors. Authors’ 
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trend in nominal mortgage interest rates—a major feature of 
the housing market over the past decade—thus has significant 
implications for home ownership affordability (the home-
price-to-income ratio) and for the equilibrium return on 
housing (the rent-to-price ratio). Accounting for this trend in 
interest rates in the analysis casts doubt on the existence of a 
bubble.
Second, the particular home price index used to calculate 
these ratios can have an impact on the conclusions derived 
from them. Again, when the appropriate index is used in 
calculating the ratios, doubt is cast on the evidence of a bubble.
4.1 Home-Price-to-Income Ratio
The secular decline of nominal interest rates over the 1990s had 
a dramatic impact on the size of the mortgage that could be 
carried with the median family income. In 1990, the average 
nominal interest rate on thirty-year, fixed-rate conventional 
mortgages was a little more than 10 percent. By 2003, that 
interest rate had declined to around 5 3/4 percent. Combined 
with the roughly 50 percent increase in the median family 
income from 1990 to 2003, this decline in interest rates resulted 
in a nearly 130 percent increase in the maximum mortgage 
amount that a family with the median income could qualify for 
under standard underwriting criteria (Chart 5).24, 25 Over the 
same period, the OFHEO home price index rose 72 percent. 
Perhaps we should be asking why home prices did not rise even 
more under the circumstances.      
Taking into account the influence that declining nominal 
mortgage interest rates have on cash flow affordability leads to 
a quite different assessment of current home prices than does 
the simple home-price-to-income ratio. To demonstrate this, 
we compute the ratio between the annual principal and interest 
payments at prevailing mortgage rates on a constant-quality 
new single-family home (assuming a thirty-year, 80 percent 
loan-to-value [LTV] ratio loan) and median family income. 
This ratio has been relatively stable, around 15 percent, for 
several years, which is as low as it has been over the past 
twenty-five years (Chart 6).26 This is in sharp contrast to the 
conditions of the late 1970s and early 1980s, when high home 
prices and high nominal interest rates combined to erode cash 
flow affordability. 
This alternative affordability ratio thus suggests that a 
standard single-family home still remains quite affordable 
from a cash flow standpoint, even though home prices have 
increased rapidly in recent years. This in turn implies that 
home prices have risen in line with declines in mortgage 
interest rates and increases in median family income. Both 
of these conclusions argue against the existence of a home 
price bubble.FRBNY Economic Policy Review / December 2004 7
Chart 7
Ratios of Owners’ Equivalent Rent 
to Alternative Price Indexes
Sources: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census and 
Bureau of Economic Analysis; Office of Federal Housing Enterprise 
Oversight (OFHEO).
Note: Shaded areas indicate periods designated national recessions 
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4.2 Rent-to-Price Ratio
The rent-to-price ratio typically used to support the notion of 
a home price bubble has two flaws. The first is that the OFHEO 
(repeat sales) index usually is used as the home price measure. 
We noted earlier that there is evidence that the OFHEO index 
is not a constant-quality price index. In contrast, the 
numerator of the rent-to-price ratio (that is, owners’ 
equivalent rent) is designed to capture the implicit rent of a 
constant-quality owner-occupied housing unit, and the CPI 
procedures control for changes in a unit’s size and 
amenities.27, 28 Thus, in the standard rent-to-price ratio, the 
numerator and the denominator are conceptually inconsistent.
Constructing this ratio using the constant-quality new 
home price index from the U.S. Bureau of the Census makes 
the numerator and the denominator more conceptually 
consistent, but results in a dramatic difference in the 
conclusion one would draw. The rent-to-price ratio derived 
from the constant-quality new home price has fallen very little 
over the past few years and remains well within its historical 
range (Chart 7). Again, instead of providing evidence of a 
home price bubble, a consistently measured rent-to-price ratio 
indicates that home prices are not out of line with their 
fundamentals.
The second flaw of the standard rent-to-price ratio is that, 
much like the standard price-to-income ratio, it fails to take 
into account the significant decline of interest rates. A home is 
an income-producing asset, conceptually similar to a stock. 
The value of such an asset is the discounted present value of the 
net income it provides, with the discount rate being the current 
yield on a competing asset with comparable risk characteristics. 
Even if the net income stream remains constant, a decline in 
the discount rate will boost the equilibrium value of the asset. 
A simple asset pricing model allows us to incorporate 
interest rates into the rent-to-price ratio. For example, Poterba 
(1984) suggests that, in equilibrium, homeowners equalize the 
marginal cost and benefit of the services derived from the 
housing assets they own. The marginal benefit is the real 
implicit rental price from the structure, while the marginal cost 
is the user cost of the asset. As defined originally by Jorgenson 
(1963), the user cost is the sum of the after-tax opportunity cost 
of holding the capital asset, after-tax property taxes, and 
depreciation and repair, minus the expected capital gain of the 
asset. This arbitrage condition can be expressed as:
(1)              .
In equation 1,   is the implicit rent of the structure,  is the 
home price index,  is the income tax rate,   is the short-term 
(three-month Treasury bill) interest rate,29   is the property 
tax rate,   is the depreciation (plus repair) rate, and   is 
expected capital gains from the housing asset. Rearranging 
equation 1, we get a form that expresses the interest rate 
adjustment to the rent-to-price ratio:
(2)           .
Equation 2 shows that the rent-to-price ratio should be 
adjusted by subtracting the interest rate and property tax rate, 
both on an after-tax basis, and the depreciation rate. This 
adjusted ratio is then inversely related to expected home price 
appreciation. In equilibrium, unusually low levels of the 
adjusted rent-to-price ratio suggest that housing market 
participants expect high rates of home price appreciation, a key 
ingredient of an asset bubble.
Calculating the expression on the left-hand side of 
equation 2 using the constant-quality new home price index 
(and indexing it to make it comparable with the indexes in 
Chart 7), we see that the adjusted rent-to-price ratio is not at a 
level that suggests a home price bubble exists (Chart 8).30 
Instead, the period when this ratio was quite low was in 2000, 
but the other factors in the market (including the strong 
income gains at that time) prevented prices from falling. With 
the subsequent decline in interest rates, the ratio is now at a 
level in the upper part of its historical range.
As another approach to assessing expectations of future 
price appreciation, we use micro data to estimate the left-hand 
side of equation 2. A sample of renter-occupied single-family 
homes from the American Housing Survey for odd-numbered 
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Chart 9
CPI, Constant-Quality Index, and Expected Home 
Price Appreciation
Sources: American Housing Survey; U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau 
of Labor Statistics; U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census.
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Ratio of Opportunity-Cost-Adjusted Rent to Prices
Sources: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census and 
Bureau of Economic Analysis; Board of Governors of the Federal 
Reserve System; authors’ calculations.
Notes: The ratio was constructed using the constant-quality home 
price index. Shaded areas indicate periods designated national 
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years from 1985 through 2001 is used to estimate, for each 
sample year, a model of log rents as a function of physical and 
locational characteristics.31 We use this model to estimate rents 
for owner-occupied homes with values around the median 
price of existing single-family homes sold. Then, using the 
equilibrium condition expressed by equation 2, as well as 
estimates for property taxes and insurance and an assumed 
depreciation rate of 2.5 percent per year, we estimate the 
expected asset appreciation rate inherent in the rent-price 
relationship. This exercise suggests that expectations of future 
price appreciation have been slowing over the past decade, 
roughly in line with the slowing of overall inflation (Chart 9). 
It also supports the conclusion that the current housing market 
is not characterized by widespread expectations of rapid future 
price appreciation.
5. Housing Sector Analysis 
Using a Structural Model 
Our analysis of both cash flow affordability and a simple asset 
valuation model suggests that, given the steep decline in 
interest rates, home prices do not appear to be at unusually 
high levels. Moreover, the housing market does not appear to 
be driven by expectations of rapid future price appreciation. 
However, to evaluate further the possibility of a bubble, we use 
a structural model of the housing sector developed in 
McCarthy and Peach (2002).
We use a stock-flow investment model in which the 
equilibrium price per unit of housing established in the market 
for the existing stock determines the rate of gross additions (see 
the box for details). If those gross additions exceed the number 
of units lost because of depreciation, demolition, and other 
causes, the stock grows over time. In long-run equilibrium, the 
gross additions equal losses to the stock so that the stock 
remains unchanged. The short-run dynamics of the model are 
such that there is slow adjustment to this long-run equilibrium. 
The key variables determining demand for the existing stock 
are permanent income and the user cost of residential capital. 
The key variables determining flow supply are the price per 
unit of stock and construction costs. 
The price per unit of the existing stock is determined in the 
demand side of the model, making the difference between the 
actual home price and the estimated equilibrium price of 
particular interest in assessing the existence of a bubble. A 
positive difference would imply that current prices are higher 
than what the fundamentals can support over the long run, 
thus suggesting a bubble. However, the opposite appears to be 
true; current prices are low compared with their long-run 
determinants, suggesting that a bubble does not exist 
(Chart 10).32 
Of course, home prices have been rising rapidly since the 
mid-1990s, implying that equilibrium home prices have been 
rising even more quickly in recent years. In fact, equilibrium 
home prices generally have risen rapidly since the early 1990s, 
although they had accelerated markedly in 2001-02 before 
falling off slightly in 2003 (Chart 10).FRBNY Economic Policy Review / December 2004 9
In the short-run supply equation, the residential investment 
rate increases when actual home prices exceed  . It is also affected 
in the short run by construction costs, home price inflation 
(see Mayer and Somerville [2000]), land prices, and the inventory 
of homes on the market.b Therefore, the short-run supply 
equation is:
(4)     
                               .
From equation 3,   is a measure of the gap between the 
current actual price and the price implied by long-run demand 
factors  that affect home price inflation over the near term. As such, 
in this article we use   as a measure of the difference 
between actual home prices and their fundamentals.
Estimates of the long-run demand function, equation 1, 
which are used in constructing our measure of a home price 
bubble, are presented in the table.c The estimates are similar to 
those of McCarthy and Peach (2002). The coefficients have the 
correct signs and are statistically significant. In particular, the 
coefficient on consumption indicates a high long-run income 
elasticity of housing demand, while the long-run elasticity of 
demand to user costs is relatively small.
p
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The Structural Housing Model
The structural housing model that underlies our estimates is an 
updated version of the model in McCarthy and Peach (2002). The 
model is a version of the commonly used standard stock-flow 
model that takes into account the gradual response of housing to 
monetary policy.
The model is anchored by a long-run equilibrium. On the 
demand side, given the stock of housing  , the long-run demand 
function determines the (real) price   that clears the housing 
stock given the permanent income of households (proxied by 
nondurables and services consumption  ) and the housing user 
cost  . This relationship can be expressed as (all variables in 
logarithms):
(1)                          .
On the supply side, the long-run supply price   induces a 
sufficiently high investment rate (I/H) to cover depreciation and 
expected housing stock growth given the cost structure   of 
home construction firms. This relationship can be expressed as:
(2)                         .
The housing market adjusts slowly toward equilibrium, and we 
account for this by incorporating an error-correction process in 
the demand and supply sides of the model.a Specifically, if a shock 
occurs when the model is in long-run equilibrium, wedges develop 
between the current price and the long-run demand and supply 
prices. A fraction of each wedge is closed in a period, so that they 
slowly dissipate if no other shocks occur.
On the demand side, this implies that home price inflation 
tends to decline if there is a positive gap between actual home 
prices and  . Also, home price inflation in the short run is 
affected by permanent income changes, user costs, household 
financial wealth, and tenant rent inflation. Therefore, the short-
run demand equation is:
(3)        
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a For evidence, see, among others, Fair (1972), Rosen and Smith (1983), DiPasquale and Wheaton (1994), Mayer and Somerville (2000), 
and McCarthy and Peach (2002).
b For evidence on the inventory effect, see Topel and Rosen (1988), DiPasquale and Wheaton (1994), Mayer and Somerville (2000), 
and McCarthy and Peach (2002).
c We estimate equations 1 and 2 jointly using the Johansen maximum likelihood estimation method for cointegrating vectors assuming two 
cointegrating vectors and the restrictions implied by the two equations. We also include one additional restriction: the magnitude of the coefficients 
on the housing stock and on consumption is the same. This additional constraint was imposed to obtain coefficients of “reasonable” magnitude. 
If we exclude this constraint, the qualitative pattern of the difference between actual and “fundamental” prices is similar to that in Chart 10—in 
particular, actual home price is below that determined by fundamentals—but the magnitudes are much larger.
Estimates of User Demand (Equation 1)
1981:1-2003:3
Variable Coefficient Standard Error
Housing stock -3.205 0.245
Consumption 3.205 0.245
User cost 0.202 0.024
Source: Authors’ calculations.
Notes: The dependent variable is the log real home price. The 
Johansen maximum likelihood estimation method was used 
to produce estimates. The data include four lags in the vector 
autoregression.  10 Are Home Prices the Next “Bubble”?
Chart 10
OFHEO Index Relative to Equilibrium Price 
Sources: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis;
Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight (OFHEO); authors’ 
calculations.
Note: Shaded areas indicate periods designated national recessions 
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Chart 11
Equilibrium Home Price Growth and Contribution
from Economic Strength
Source: Authors’ calculations.
Note: Shaded areas indicate periods designated national recessions 













To examine the factors behind the rise in the model’s 
equilibrium prices, we decompose the equilibrium price 
appreciation into the portion based on strong economic 
growth—the difference between consumption and housing 
stock growth rates—and into the portion based on declining 
user costs. Chart 11 presents the year-over-year growth rate of 
the equilibrium price along with the economic-growth 
contribution; the difference between the two is the 
contribution of user cost changes. The dramatic decline in user 
costs induced by the decline in interest rates clearly has been 
the principal factor in the 2001-02 acceleration of equilibrium 
home prices. Nonetheless, a solid base was established by the 
strong economic growth in the 1990s, as most of the impetus 
for equilibrium home price appreciation came from the 
period’s robust economy.
Looking forward, we note that one concern prompted by 
this recent rise in equilibrium home prices is the effect of an 
increase in interest rates. However, we believe that higher 
interest rates would not necessarily lead to a large decline in 
equilibrium home prices. In the current environment, rising 
rates probably would result from stronger employment and 
income growth. Therefore, while the contribution from user 
costs would be negative, the economic-strength contribution 
would counteract it. 
Our econometric evidence thus confirms our previous 
analysis: The combination of the strong economic growth of the 
1990s and the declines in interest rates is more than sufficient 
to explain the rise of home prices since the mid-1990s. 
6. Susceptibility of Home Prices 
to a Steep Decline: Evidence 
from Regional Markets
Our analysis indicates that a home price bubble does not exist. 
Nonetheless, home prices could fall because of deteriorating 
fundamentals, and thus it is useful to gauge the magnitude of 
previous declines. Nationally, nominal price declines have been 
rare (Chart 1). Moreover, real price declines—an important 
consideration during this period of low inflation—have been 
mild. For example, the early 1980s and early 1990s featured 
weak fundamentals—slow income growth and high nominal 
interest rates and unemployment—yet real home prices 
declined only about 5 percent.33
One reason for the moderate volatility of national home 
prices is that the housing market comprises many 
heterogeneous regional markets. In the past, some regions 
experienced wide swings in real home prices that were not 
apparent in the aggregate statistics. For example, real home 
prices in California and Massachusetts have been much more 
volatile historically than those for the nation as a whole 
(Chart 12). These wide regional swings may have been 
influenced by fluctuations in population and income growth 
that would not occur at the national level.
For most states, income and home prices have historically 
been closely related.34 Therefore, to examine the role of 
regional economic growth on recent regional home price 
movements, we compare personal income growth and home 
price appreciation by state for the period 1999:1 to 2003:2. The 
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Chart 13
Home Price Appreciation and Aggregate Income 
Growth by State
1999:1-2003:2
Sources: Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight; 
U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis; 
authors’ calculations.
Note: AR is Arkansas, AZ is Arizona, CA is California, CT is Connecticut, 
DC is Washington, D.C., ID is Idaho, IN is Indiana, MA is Massachusetts, 
ME is Maine, MI is Michigan, MN is Minnesota, NE is Nebraska, NH is 
New Hampshire, NJ is New Jersey, NM is New Mexico, NY is New York, 
OH is Ohio, RI is Rhode Island, TN is Tennessee, UT is Utah, WV is 
West Virginia.
increases across regions. To investigate the role of supply 
elasticity, we examine two relationships across states. First, we 
compare the volatility of home price appreciation with recent 
home price appreciation. Second, we look at state price changes 
relative to aggregate fluctuations and compare this with recent 
state home price appreciation.
If supply elasticity has been an important factor behind 
recent home price movements, we would expect that states 
with higher home price appreciation over recent years 
historically have had more volatile home prices. Comparing 
home price appreciation over 1999-2003 with the standard 
deviation of home price appreciation over 1975-99, we find this 
to be true. States such as California, Massachusetts, New 
Hampshire, New York, and New Jersey, as well as Washington, 
D.C., have tended to have the most volatile home prices as well 
as strong appreciation over recent years (Chart 14).
Another implication of differing supply elasticities is that 
home prices should be more responsive to aggregate demand 
fluctuations in states with inelastic supply. We measure this 
responsiveness by the coefficient on aggregate home price 
appreciation in a regression, estimated over 1975-99, of 
state home price appreciation on aggregate appreciation. 
Chart 12
State Fluctuations Masked by Aggregation
Sources: Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight (OFHEO); 
U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis.
Note: Shaded areas indicate periods designated national recessions 
by the National Bureau of Economic Research.
















One reason for the moderate volatility of 
national home prices is that the housing 
market comprises many heterogeneous 
regional markets.
personal income growth, as one would expect (Chart 13). 
However, there are several states with equally high growth of 
personal income but much lower home price appreciation. 
Therefore, the recent regional patterns of home price 
appreciation do not just reflect faster versus slower growing 
states, but also other factors.
One such factor is the ease of increasing supply. Over the 
1999-2003 period, home price appreciation was highest in 
states such as California, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New 
York, and New Jersey, and in Washington, D.C.35 Some recent 
research suggests that, because of population density and 
building restrictions, the supply of new housing units is likely 
to be relatively inelastic in these areas.36 In contrast, states with 
comparable growth of income but relatively low home price 
appreciation were Utah, New Mexico, Idaho, and North 
Dakota, where supply probably is more elastic.
Because inelastic supply implies larger price responses to 
similar-sized shifts in demand, supply elasticity may be an 
important factor behind some of the recent larger price 12 Are Home Prices the Next “Bubble”?
Chart 15
Home Price Appreciation and Responsiveness 
to Aggregate Price Shifts by State 
Percent
Sources: Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight; 
authors’ calculations.
Notes: Home price responsiveness is measured by the slope coefficient 
of the regression of state price appreciation on national price 
appreciation. AK is Alaska, AZ is Arizona, CA is California, CT is 
Connecticut, DC is Washington, D.C., FL is Florida, HI is Hawaii, MA is 
Massachusetts, ME is Maine, MN is Minnesota, MS is Mississippi, NH is 
New Hampshire, NJ is New Jersey, NM is New Mexico, NY is New York,  
RI is Rhode Island, SD is South Dakota, UT is Utah.
Annualized home price appreciation, 
1999:1-2003:2




























By comparing this measure with recent home price apprecia-
tion, we find that the more responsive states tend to have had 
higher appreciation in recent years, consistent with the inelastic 
supply supposition (Chart 15).
Our evidence thus suggests that changing demand 
fundamentals should cause prices to fluctuate more in 
California and the northeast than in other areas. Therefore, the 
strong home price appreciation over 1999-2003 in those areas 
is a consequence of improving economic conditions combined 
with relatively unresponsive supply. Our evidence also implies 
that recent state price fluctuations can be explained through an 
expanded model of fundamentals. This conclusion is in 
contrast to Higgins and Osler (1998), who suggest that 
unusually strong price appreciation in some states (compared 
with the predictions of a simple pricing model) indicates home 
price bubbles in those regions.
7.C o n c l u s i o n
Our analysis of the U.S. housing market in recent years finds 
little evidence to support the existence of a national home price 
bubble. Rather, it appears that home prices have risen in line 
with increases in personal income and declines in nominal 
interest rates. Moreover, expectations of rapid price 
appreciation do not appear to be a major factor behind the 
strong housing market. 
Our observations also suggest that home prices are not likely 
to plunge in response to deteriorating fundamentals to the 
extent envisioned by some analysts. Real home prices have 
been less volatile than other asset prices, such as equity prices. 
Several reasons have been cited for the lower volatility, 
including the cost to speculate in the housing market.37 
However, there have been examples of extreme home price 
volatility where it presumably has been costly to speculate, such 
as in Japan in the late 1980s and the 1990s. Therefore, we prefer 
instead to emphasize that the lower volatility of national home 
prices likely stems from the disjointed nature of the U.S. 
housing market.
Furthermore, our state-level analysis of home prices finds 
that while prices have risen much faster recently for some states 
than for the nation, the supply of housing in those states 
appears to be inelastic, making prices there more volatile. 
We therefore conclude that much of the volatility at the state 
level is the result of changing fundamentals rather than 
regional bubbles. Nevertheless, weaker fundamentals have 
caused home price declines in those areas with inelastic supply. 
If the past is any guide, however, that phenomenon is unlikely 
to plunge the U.S. economy into a recession.
Chart 14
Home Price Appreciation and Volatility by State 
Percent 
Annualized home price appreciation, 
1999:1-2003:2 
Sources: Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight (OFHEO);
authors’ calculations.
Note: AK is Alaska, CA is California, DC is Washington, D.C., HI is 
Hawaii, MA is Massachusetts, ME is Maine, MN is Minnesota, ND is 
North Dakota, NH is New Hampshire, NJ is New Jersey, NY is New York,  
RI is Rhode Island, SD is South Dakota.
Standard deviation of year-over-year 
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1.  This calculation is based on the Office of Federal Housing 
Enterprise Oversight (OFHEO) repeat sales home price index relative 
to the personal consumption expenditures deflator. This and other 
measures of home prices are discussed later.
2.  See, for example, Baker (2002).
3.  See Tracy, Schneider, and Chan (1999) and Tracy and Schneider 
(2001).
4.  The estimates by Higgins and Osler (1998) suggest that these 
nonfundamental home price movements reduced aggregate 
residential investment by 1.1 percentage points in 1991.
5. Engelhardt (1996) also finds a significant effect, but only for real 
capital losses. However, Hoynes and McFadden (1997) and Levin 
(1998) find little or no effect of housing wealth on consumption 
or saving.
6. For example, see Greenspan (1999).
7.  As of 2003:3, outstanding home mortgages totaled more than 
$6.6 trillion, while owners’ equity as a percentage of the value of 
household real estate was at a record low.
8. For a discussion of the quantitative effects of the financial 
accelerator on economic activity, see Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist 
(1999). Aoki, Proudman, and Vlieghe (2002) discuss possible financial 
accelerator effects through housing in the United Kingdom. 
9. A recent study whose conclusions are similar to ours, although 
obtained using different methods, is Case and Shiller (2003).
10.  Moreover, both measures represent a subset of their respective 
universes. The median price of existing homes sold reflects only those 
homes sold through a multiple-listing service while the median price 
of new homes sold reflects only so-called spec-built homes, where the 
land and structure are sold as one package.
11.  The basic methodology for repeat sales indexes was first described 
in Bailey, Muth, and Nourse (1963). Case and Shiller (1989) modified 
it to correct for possible heteroskedasticity induced by varying time 
between sales for different properties.
12.  Details of the OFHEO index can be found in Calhoun 
(1996).
13. For example, see Hatzius (2002, p. 10, footnote 2).
14.  Another problem with this method of real-time analysis is that the 
whole history of the index is subject to revision in each period as more 
homes are sold that had transactions in previous periods.
15. This index, however, may not account for changes in quality that 
do not lead to changes in these measured characteristics. These may be 
significant. In American Housing Survey data from 1985 to 1993, the 
percentage of homes that had built new (or remodeled) additions, 
kitchens, and bathrooms was 4, 9, and 12 percent, respectively. In 
comparison, 20 percent of households had installed new insulation or 
storm doors/windows and 78 percent had “routine maintenance” 
expenditures, some of which could have improved quality (see 
Gyourko and Tracy [2003, Table 1]). Nonetheless, the constant-
quality index from the U.S. Bureau of the Census does appear to 
control for more quality changes than does the OFHEO index.
16.  Also note that the constant-quality new home index is more 
volatile than the OFHEO index, probably indicating the difficulty 
in calculating such an index.
17.  See U.S. Bureau of the Census (1999, 2000).
18.  Gyourko and Tracy (2003), using American Housing Survey data, 
find that households tend to spend more on maintenance and 
improvements when home prices in the metropolitan area are rising. 
This phenomenon could further accentuate the rise in the OFHEO 
price index.
19. Meese and Wallace (1997) identify some shortcomings of repeat 
sales indexes for studying real estate prices at the municipality level. 
These include the possibility that repeat sales are not representative of 
overall sales, small sample problems, and the nonconstancy of implied 
housing characteristic prices (an implicit assumption of repeat sales 
indexes is that such implicit prices are constant). At the more 
aggregated levels that we study, the first two problems probably are 
not important; however, the relationship presented in Chart 2 suggests 
that the latter problem remains relevant for repeat sales indexes at the 
national level.
20.  See Hulten (2003).
21. Beyond this, some commentators have pointed to the high 
turnover rate of the housing stock, although this rate has been high 
for some time. 14 Are Home Prices the Next “Bubble”? 
Endnotes (Continued)
22.  See Campbell and Shiller (2001) for a discussion of this 
mechanism in regard to the dividend-to-price ratio for corporate 
equities.
23. Even though they may not describe the current situation as a 
bubble, some analysts have used these same measures to argue that 
the rate of home price appreciation will slow dramatically in the near 
future. See, for example, Hatzius (2002).
24. We assume a thirty-year amortization and that a maximum of 
27 percent of pretax income can be devoted to principal and interest 
payments. 
25. This is the opposite of the effect that the rise in inflation had on 
affordability in the late 1970s. As discussed by Kearl (1979), the rise of 
nominal interest rates combined with the nominal long-term fixed- 
rate mortgage contract meant that households whose real permanent 
income was sufficient to purchase a particular home could not because 
the initial real payments were beyond the household’s current 
resources.
26. Because we assume a constant loan-to-value ratio in this 
calculation, an increase in LTV ratios over this period would result in 
higher values in later years of our affordability ratio than we show. 
However, although LTV ratios rose during the 1990s, they have 
declined recently, and the current average ratio is near that of the 
mid-1980s. For example, the average LTV was 73.6 percent in 2003, 
compared with 74.3 percent in 1983 and 77.0 percent in 1984 (Federal 
Housing Finance Board data, which exclude refinancing loans). 
27. For more information on the concepts behind the measurement 
of owners’ equivalent rent in the CPI, see Ptacek and Baskin (1996).
28. Although we do not pursue the issue here, our other research 
suggests that the owners’ equivalent rent index produced by the 
Bureau of Labor Statistics does not correspond to an alternative 
owners’ equivalent rent series derived from the American Housing 
Survey. See McCarthy and Peach (2004).
29. As in Poterba (1984), we use a short-term interest rate to measure 
the opportunity cost of holding the housing asset. This implicitly 
assumes that the homeowner can borrow or lend at that rate. If we 
instead use mortgage interest rates, which implicitly assumes that the 
homeowner can only borrow through the mortgage market, the 
qualitative results are similar because mortgage rates also have 
declined. Finally, note that equation 1 uses the nominal interest rate 
because the tax deductibility of interest payments on home mortgages 
is based on nominal payments. However, because nominal home price 
appreciation is subtracted from interest payments in equation 1, the 
equation can be rearranged to present a relationship in terms of the 
real interest rate, real home price appreciation, and general inflation.
30. In this calculation, the income tax rate is the marginal rate for a 
household with twice the median income and the property tax rate is 
a weighted aggregate across states; both are from the Board of 
Governors of the Federal Reserve System. The interest rate is the three-
month Treasury bill rate. The depreciation rate is calculated using the 
depreciation and net stock of single-family housing from the Bureau 
of Economic Analysis’ Fixed Assets and Consumer Durables database. 
We arrive at similar conclusions when using the OFHEO index in 
place of the constant-quality new home price index of the U.S. Bureau 
of the Census.
31. This part of the exercise is similar to the analysis of Crone, 
Nakamura, and Voith (2001), who also estimate hedonic regressions 
for tenant rent. However, one major difference is that we use a 
logarithmic specification whereas Crone, Nakamura, and Voith use 
the Box-Cox transformation. 
32. In estimating this model, we use the OFHEO index as the home 
price index. Neither the OFHEO nor the constant-quality new home 
price index from the U.S. Bureau of the Census is ideal for this model: 
the OFHEO index is not a constant-quality index but it does relate to 
prices of the existing stock, while the other index refers to new home 
sales only and not to the existing stock. We present the results using 
the OFHEO index because that index is used more commonly. 
However, our conclusions using the constant-quality new home price 
index are the same.
33. Another reason why home prices are less volatile is that when 
demand is weak, reported prices may include the value of seller 
concessions (for example, below-market financing). See Peach and 
Crellin (1985). 
34. See Case and Shiller (2003).
35. Interestingly, Case and Shiller (2003) find that most of these states 
traditionally have had a more unstable relationship between home 
prices and income.Endnotes (Continued)
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36. See Glaeser and Gyourko (2003).
37. For example, in testimony before the U.S. House of 
Representatives’ Joint Economic Committee on April 17, 2002, 
Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan said: “. . . sales in the real 
estate market incur substantial transactions costs and, when most 
homes are sold, the seller must physically move out. Doing so often 
entails significant financial and emotional costs and is an obvious 
impediment to stimulating a bubble through speculative trading in 
homes.”References
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